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Abstract—Centralized DNS over HTTPS/TLS (DoH/DoT) res-
olution, which has started being deployed by major hosting
providers and web browsers, has sparked controversy among
Internet activists and privacy advocates due to several privacy
concerns. This design decision causes the trace of all DNS
resolutions to be exposed to a third-party resolver, different than
the one specified by the user’s access network. In this work we
propose K-resolver, a DNS resolution mechanism that disperses
DNS queries across multiple DoH resolvers, reducing the amount
of information about a user’s browsing activity exposed to each
individual resolver. As a result, none of the resolvers can learn
a user’s entire web browsing history. We have implemented
a prototype of our approach for Mozilla Firefox, and used it
to evaluate the performance of web page load time compared
to the default centralized DoH approach. While our K-resolver
mechanism has some effect on DNS resolution time and web page
load time, we show that this is mainly due to the geographical
location of the selected DoH servers. When more well-provisioned
anycast servers are available, our approach incurs negligible
overhead while improving user privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduced in 1983, the domain name system (DNS) is a
hierarchical naming system made up of name servers distributed
across the Internet [34]. DNS maps human-memorable domain
names (e.g., example.com) to their corresponding IP address,
which are then used to route and deliver resources between
connected devices. For that reason, DNS is involved in almost
every online activity. The original DNS protocol, however, was
not designed with security and privacy in mind. More specifi-
cally, DNS packets are not encrypted or authenticated, resulting
in several security vulnerabilities and privacy risks. Man-on-
the-side (MoTS) attackers can tamper with DNS responses to
re-direct users to malicious hosts [1, 8, 24, 45], while state-level
adversaries can passively monitor DNS traffic for surveillance
or inject forged DNS responses to block unwanted connections
for censorship purposes [2, 10, 12, 13, 37].
As a response to these threats, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [16]
and DNS over TLS (DoT) [19] were recently proposed and
are under active development, with many web browsers and
network operators already supporting them. Despite the use of
different protocols to encapsulate DNS messages, these two
techniques have the same purpose of preserving the integrity and
confidentiality of DNS resolutions against adversaries between
a client and its recursive resolver (also referred to as recursor).
Although the benefits provided by DoH/DoT against threats
“under the recursor” are clear, they come with the cost of trusting
the DoH/DoT operator with the entire web browsing history
of users. Recently, the design decision of Firefox [7]—one of
the most popular web browsers—to centralize DNS resolutions
to a single DoH server operated by Cloudflare, has led to
controversy due to several privacy concerns [20, 21]. A similar
plan by Google Chrome has also faced strong opposition [32].
As a step towards mitigating the privacy concerns stemming
from the exposure of all DNS resolutions of a user—effectively
the user’s entire domain-level browsing history—to an addi-
tional third party entity, in this work we propose K-resolver,
a resolution mechanism in which DNS queries are dispersed
across multiple (K) DoH servers, allowing each of them to
individually learn only a fraction (1/K) of a user’s browsing
history.
We evaluated the privacy benefit provided by this mech-
anism using 200 user profiles, with each profile containing
100 domain names sampled from the top one million popular
websites [28]. In addition, we also evaluated the impact of our
resolution scheme on the performance of web page load time.
Although both DNS resolution and web page load time take
slightly longer when browsing with our K-resolver mechanism,
we show that this impact is due to the geographical location of
the selected DoH recursors. If more well-provisioned anycast
DoH/DoT servers are available, our proposed mechanism can
be expected to provide comparable performance while also
improving the online privacy of Internet users.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
DNS maps domain names to their IP address(es). The
mapping between a domain and its associated IP address(es)
is called a resource record, which is stored in a distributed
fashion on the DNS hierarchy, as illustrated in Figure 1.
There are two traditional resolution methods to obtain the IP
address(es) of a domain. The first way is via an iterative DNS
resolution. For instance, to find the IP address of example.com,
the client first queries the root name server to obtain the IP
address(es) of the .com name server, then queries the .com
name server for the IP address(es) of example.com, and so
on. However, traversing the whole DNS hierarchy for every
lookup can be costly and time consuming if the client needs
to look up many different domains multiple times. Recursive
DNS resolution was introduced to cope with this problem. In
a recursive resolution, a recursor acts as a proxy between the
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Fig. 1. The domain name system hierarchy.
client and the rest of the DNS hierarchy. When the recursor
receives the query for example.com from the client, it will
iteratively look up the IP address(es) in the same manner
described above if the resource record of example.com is not in
its cache. However, if the domain was queried by another client
and was previously cached, the recursor will answer the query
directly from its cache, saving the iterative lookup overhead.
As mentioned earlier, these traditional DNS resolutions
are not encrypted, exposing all DNS queries and responses in
plaintext, and thus leading to numerous security and privacy
problems. The DoH and DoT protocols were proposed as an
effort to address these problems. While these two techniques
can be deployed at all levels of the DNS hierarchy to encrypt
DNS messages between the involved parties, there is recently
a push for the deployment of DoH/DoT “under the recursor,”
with major public DNS resolvers already supporting it (e.g.,
Google [50], Cloudflare [52]). Although the deployment of
DoH/DoT “above the recursor” at authoritative name servers is
also recommended by the Internet Engineering Task Force [29],
it has not been widely adopted. To the best of our knowledge, at
the time of writing this paper, only the name server of Facebook
has collaborated with Cloudflare to secure DNS traffic between
Cloudflare’s recursors and Facebook’s name servers [5].
Encrypting DNS messages to protect them from eavesdrop-
ping or manipulation is a desirable improvement from which
all privacy-conscious Internet users would benefit. However,
the recent controversy is over how that encryption should be
done, especially when it comes to the cost of having to trust
an additional entity with the user’s entire browsing history,
in case the web browser is configured to centralize all DNS
resolutions to only one recursor—which is currently the default
configuration for Mozilla Firefox [7]. This motivated us to
explore the K-resolver approach as a resolution mechanism to
remedy this “single-point-of-trust” problem. More specifically,
instead of sending all DNS resolution requests to only one
recursor, our mechanism allows users to distribute their DNS
queries among multiple K recursors. As a result, none of the
recursors can learn the entire browsing history of the user.
III. THREAT MODEL
The bottom line of recent debates around DoH/DoT is
about the decision of centralizing all DNS queries into a
single DoH/DoT third-party recursor by major browser vendors
(Mozilla Firefox from version 62 [7], and Google Chrome from
version 79 [50]). While users can configure these browsers to
use any DoH recursor of their preference, they still have to trust
the selected recursor with their entire web browsing history,
posing a severe threat to their privacy if the recursor maliciously
uses the observed DNS queries for illicit purposes.
To mitigate this privacy threat, our K-resolver mechanism is
proposed to limit the amount of browsing information known
by each recursor. Note that our proposal does not aim to
anonymize a given user’s browsing activities by decoupling
the link between users and their DNS queries, which is not
the original purpose of DoH/DoT either. For anonymous DNS
resolutions, users may use anonymous communication systems
to route their DNS traffic [15]. For instance, DNS-over-HTTPS-
over-Tor is one of the more complicated methods to secure DNS
traffic, which has been already implemented by Cloudflare [40].
Our threat model is oblivious to the relationship between
hosting providers and operators of the recursor, who may be the
same entity. Nonetheless, we consider this relationship as an
orthogonal problem due to the current state of web co-location,
in which the vast majority of web servers are hosted by only
a handful of hosting providers [42], among which Google and
Cloudflare are dominant [14]. For example, with our K-resolver
mechanism, the domain name of a website may be resolved
by a recursor that does not belong to Google or Cloudflare.
However, if the website or a third-party resource of the site
happens to be hosted by Google or Cloudflare, then the fact
that it was visited by a particular user cannot be hidden from
these same companies.
Ultimately, with the K-resolver resolution mechanism in
place, each among K selected recursors can only obtain at
most 1/K part of the user’s browsing history, which is still a
desirable outomce for privacy-conscious users.
IV. DESIGN
As most privacy concerns around DoH stem from the design
decision of major web browsers to centralize all DNS queries
into a single DoH recursor, we focused on implementing our
proposed mechanism in a web browser as a proof of concept.
Since Mozilla is one of the first vendors to support DoH in
their browser, we chose to use Firefox and modify its source
code to integrate our K-resolver mechanism into the browser.
To that end, our implementation of the K-resolver mechanism
is solely a client-end modification of the Firefox web browser
without changing any other components of the DNS hierarchy
or the DoH/DoT standards.
The design of our K-resolver approach is centered around
two main design considerations, which we discuss below.
A. Domain-recursor Pair Fixation
A particular domain name, which is entered in the URL
bar of the browser (parent domain), should always be resolved
by the same recursor. One of the ways to distribute DNS
queries is naively rotating queries among recursors in a round-
robin fashion. If the number of visited websites is small
while the number of recursors is large enough, a round-robin
rotation approach may achieve the design goal of our K-resolver
mechanism over a short period of time. Unfortunately, round-
robin rotation is not a sustainable solution as all selected
recursors will eventually observe all domain names visited
over a long period of time, making the situation even worse.
Therefore, a particular parent domain should always be resolved
by the same recursor, preventing other recursors from learning
the visit to that domain.
Given an indexed list of K DoH recursors selected by the
user, a domain name is resolved by a recursor whose index is
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calculated by taking the modulo of the hashed value of that
domain name concatenated with a salt value, with respect to
the K number of selected recursors. For each user, the salt
value, which can be configured by and is only known by that
user, is generated randomly so that two different users using
the same list of recursors will not end up with selecting the
same recursor to resolve the same domain.
B. Parent-domain-based Recursor Selection
All DNS queries generated from within the same web page
should be resolved by the same recursor of the parent domain.
Rendering a web page often requires the download of several
third-party resources, including images, scripts, and style sheets,
as observed by previous work [3, 9, 22, 27, 35, 38, 39]. DNS
resolutions of these third-party resources can be used as an
effective feature to fingerprint web sites. Even when being
split across recursors, some unique third-party domain names
can potentially be used to trace back to the parent domain.
Therefore, all the DNS queries generated due to the resolution
of third-party elements of a given page should also be resolved
by the same recursor of the parent domain, instead of sending
them to different resolvers.
V. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this section, we discuss how we set up and conduct
experiments to analyze the privacy benefit of our K-resolver
mechanism and its impact on web page load time.
A. Domain Name Dataset
We first generate 200 user profiles with each of them
containing 100 unique domain names. We approximate this
number based on the result from a prior study showing that most
Internet users visit an average of 89 domains per month [49].
We sample the domains from the top list of one million popular
websites obtained from the Tranco project on December 12th,
2019 [28]. To simulate a real-world scenario, for each user
profile, we select the domains based on their popularity ranking
instead of randomly picking them from the top list. Hence, a
domain with a higher rank is more likely to be selected.
B. Selection of DoH Recursors
Next, we use public DoH servers provided by the Curl
project to curate a list of recursors [47]. At the time of
conducting our study, there are 38 operators offering 53
recursors. However, many of these recursors integrate filtering
capabilities, including parental control and advertisement block-
ing. Moreover, some recursors are located in countries that are
notorious for Internet censorship—for instance, Rubyfish.cn’s
recursor is located in China. To make sure that DNS resolutions
are not biased and tampered with throughout our experiment,
we only select those active recursors that do not filter or censor
any content. After excluding recursors that are not suitable for
our study, we were left with a curated list of 26 DoH recursors.
C. Automated Web Crawling and Performance Measurement
Finally, with the K-resolver mechanism integrated in the
Firefox browser, we visited 100 domain names with each user
profile generated above. For every domain name, we launch
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Fig. 2. CDF of domains resolved per DoH recursor.
a new Firefox session to clean cached contents of previously
visited domains so that they will not have any impact on the
performance metrics of the domain currently being visited. The
whole process, from when the browser is launched until the web
page is loaded, is handled by the Browsertime framework [44].
After completely loading the web page, Browsertime is
configured to export an HTTP Archive (HAR file), containing
several performance metrics which we later use for our
analyses in §VI-B. Furthermore, to account for unavoidable
factors that may affect our experiments, such as downgraded
network performance of up-stream providers or web servers
of tested domains being busy, we visited each domain at
three different times, from the 18th to the 24th of December,
2019. We conducted our experiments on machines running
Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS with 32GB of RAM, 8 Intel Xeon X5450
processors, connected to a Gigabit educational network located
in the East coast of the United States.
VI. DATA ANALYSIS
Using the data collected in §V, we analyze the privacy
benefits provided by our K-resolver mechanism and its impact
on web page load time, compared to the default setting of
Cloudflare’s DoH recursor in the Firefox browser. For each of
the 26 DoH recursors selected, we also investigate the effect
that their geographical location has on DNS resolution time.
A. Privacy Benefit Analysis
As introduced in §III, the privacy benefit of our K-resolver
mechanism is obtained by uniformly distributing one’s visited
domains among K recursors, such that each recursor only learns
a 1/K-portion of the user’s browsing history. For instance, given
100 domain names per user profile and 26 DoH recursors, each
recursor should ideally resolve just 3–4 domain names.
However, in practice it is extremely hard to obtain an even
distribution due to several uncertainties. For example, in a real-
world scenario, we cannot know all domains that a user will visit
in advance, and thus cannot guarantee that our bucket-hashing
algorithm will evenly split all domains across the selected
recursors. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of
domains resolved per recursor in our experiment. The number
of domains resolved by each recursor exhibits a skewed normal
distribution, in which most DoH recursors (40%) resolve 3–4
domains. However, there are some corner cases in which 2.8%
of recursors do not resolve any domains, while 2.2% of the
recursors resolve from 8 to 14 domains.
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Fig. 3. CDF of the total DNS resolution time.
To examine whether our bucket-hashing algorithm can
evenly disperse sensitive domains across recursors, we consider
some domain categories as “sensitive” and check if the set of
sensitive domains within the same user profile are resolved
by different DoH recursors (the desirable behavior). More
specifically, we use Fortiguard’s Web Filter Lookup [11] to
categorize the domain names selected in §V, then consider the
following categories as sensitive: pornography, armed forces,
gambling, health and wellness, illegal or unethical, malicious
websites, medicine, other adult materials, plagiarism, proxy
avoidance, spam URLs, and weapons (sales).
Among the 200 user profiles generated in §V, we have
182 profiles containing from 1 to 6 sensitive domains each.
Among these profiles, there are only 23 profiles having sensitive
domains resolved by different recursors, while 159 profiles have
more than one sensitive domain resolved by the same recursor.
One may consider that having more than one sensitive
domain resolved by one DoH recursor is harmful for privacy.
However, this is a result of the uncertainty regarding the
sensitivity of a given website visited by a user, of which we
do not have any control. Moreover, the sensitivity of a website
can vary from site to site, depending on who, when, and from
where is visiting the site [12]. Therefore, our current design of
the K-resolver mechanism is oblivious to the sensitivity of the
resolved domains. Future work may take this sensitivity aspect
into consideration when assigning (hashing) the domain name
to a given recursor.
B. Web Page Load Time Evaluation
Next, we assess the impact of the K-resolver mechanism
on i) the DNS resolution time, and ii) the web page load time.
Figure 3 shows the CDF of the total amount of time (in
milliseconds) that it takes for all DNS names per website visit
to be resolved. The default (continuous) line represents the
time when browsing with the default DoH setting of Firefox,
while the K-resolver (dashed) line represents the time when
browsing with our K-resolver mechanism enabled.
Böttger et al. conducted a measurement study in April 2019
to compare the resolution time between the traditional DNS
and DoH for the 1,000 most popular Alexa sites [3]. Their
result shows that more than 50% of web page visits take longer
than 5,000ms in total to resolve all domains with Cloudflare’s
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Fig. 4. CDF of the average DNS resolution time.
DoH recursor. Our experiment with the default DoH setting of
Firefox, however, shows that the total resolution time has been
reduced. Specifically, more than 50% of our web page visits
require less than 3,600ms in total to resolve all domains.
Our K-resolver mechanism has a longer total resolution
time compared to the original DoH setting. More than 50%
of all visits have a total DNS resolution time longer than 10s,
about three times more than the default DoH setting of Firefox.
This is an expected result as not all DoH recursors we selected
in §V support anycast, while many of them are located in a
different continent than our vantage point (USA). We further
investigate the impact of the geographical location of these
DoH recursors on the resolution time in §VI-C.
When rendering a website, the DNS queries of involved
domains can be issued in a parallel fashion [33, 46], depending
on various uncontrollable factors (e.g., the underlying operating
system, network conditions). Moreover, websites often have
a different number of resources hosted on numerous domains.
Therefore, in many cases, focusing only on the total amount
of time for all DNS queries to be resolved will not reflect the
actual resolution time in real-world scenarios. Since Böttger
et al. [3] only report the total resolution time per website,
we also capture the response time of each individual DNS
resolution under both settings, i.e., the default DoH setting and
the K-resolver mechanism.
The CDF in Figure 4 shows the average time that each
individual DNS resolution takes when resolving with the default
DoH setting and with our K-resolver mechanism. When using
Cloudflare’s DoH recursor in the default Firefox setting, we
observe that 50% of DNS resolutions take less than 100ms,
while almost all DNS queries are resolved within 1,000ms. In
contrast, when resolving with our K-resolver mechanism, less
than 5% of the resolutions finish within 100ms, while more
than 10% take longer than 1,000ms to be resolved. We further
explain this discrepancy in §VI-C.
DNS resolution time directly impacts the web page load
time, as domains embedded in the web page need to be resolved
before the web browser can fetch resources hosted on these
domains. Next, we analyze the web page load time of domains
in the 200 user profiles generated in §V. The web page load
time is defined as the time until the “onLoad” event is triggered.
Due to the longer DNS resolution time as shown in Figures 3
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Fig. 5. CDF of the web page load time.
and 4, it is expected that most websites would take a longer time
to be loaded when browsing with our K-resolver mechanism.
As shown in Figure 5, 80% of the visits finish loading the web
page within 10,000ms under the default DoH setting, while
only 60% of the visits are completely loaded within the same
amount of time for our approach.
C. Impact of DoH Recursors’ Geographical Location
Next, we analyze each individual DoH recursor to examine
the impact of its geographical location on the resolution
time. The box plot (excluding outliers) in Figure 6 shows
the distribution of the resolution time of the 26 DoH recursors
selected in §V. Both Cloudflare’s DoH servers are within the
top five servers with the best performance, with a median
resolution time ranging from 300ms to 330ms. The rest of the
recursors have a median resolution time ranging from 330ms to
450ms. This discrepancy in performance among these recursors
is primarily due to their geographical location. More specifically,
a closer recursor to our experimental location (East Coast, USA)
is more likely to provide a lower response latency.
Table I shows the geographical location, the ping time, and
the median DNS resolution time of the 26 recursors used in our
experiments. Except for those recursors that do not respond to
our ping (ICMP) packets (whose ping time is marked as N/A),
there is a correlation between the geographical location and the
ping time. Notably, most recursors that are hosted on anycast IP
address(es) have the shortest ping time, while unicast recursors
have a longer ping time.
While the ping time to each recursor can be a good indicator
for its response latency, the DNS resolution time also depends
on how well-provisioned the recursor is. As shown in Table I,
the top four anycast recursors with the best resolution time
also have relatively small ping time. However, there are other
four anycast recursors also have relatively small ping time,
but are not among the top recursors with shortest resolution
time. This result shows that the impact on the latency of
resolution time and web page load time is mainly because
of the geographical location of the recursors that we select.
Assuming an idealistic future scenario in which more well-
provisioned anycast DoH/DoT recursors become available, our
proposed mechanism can be expected to provide comparable
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Fig. 6. The distribution of DNS resolution time of the 26 DoH recursors.
performance to the existing status quo, while also improving
the online privacy of Internet users.
VII. RELATED WORK
The rapid development and deployment of DoH/DoT has
attracted many researchers to study these new protocols. Recent
studies mainly investigate two aspects of DoH/DoT: privacy [4,
14, 18, 36] and performance [3, 6, 30].
In terms of user privacy, researchers aim to tackle two
types of adversaries. The first type includes “nosy” on-path
observers, who have the privilege to monitor the encrypted
traffic between the user and the DoH/DoT server, trying to
predict the website being visited by the user using different
traffic fingerprinting techniques [4, 14, 18]. The second type
of adversary is located at the recursor, such as compromised
or malicious recursors that have illicit intentions to use of the
user’s online history [36].
Bushart et al. [4] find that, even with encryption, DNS
traffic is still susceptible to traffic fingerprinting attacks based
on packet length and count. To address this problem, several
packet padding strategies have been implemented [31]. Siby
et al. [43] developed a model for classifying and predicting
encrypted DoH traffic using packet sizes as a key feature. The
authors show that recently implemented padding strategies are
not effective and still cannot cope with traffic analysis attacks.
Currently, client-side implementations of DoH/DoT still
use a single recursor. This design, however, turns the selected
DoH/DoT recursor into a single point of failure, but also a single
point of trust. For instance, several failures of Cloudflare’s
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TABLE I. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION INFORMATION OF THE 26 DOH
RECURSORS AND THE MEDIAN OF THEIR RESOLUTION TIME.
DoH Server Location Ping (ms) Resolution (ms)
cloudflare-dns.com anycast 3.14 300
commons.host anycast 3.99 310
dns.google anycast 2.93 312
mozilla.cloudflare-dns.com anycast 3.19 314
doh.dnswarden.com DE 87.50 327
doh.powerdns.org NL 77.90 331
doh.securedns.eu NL 85.30 335
doh.li UK 74.90 335
doh.appliedprivacy.net AT 96.60 342
doh.42l.fr FR 76.20 343
dns.dnsoverhttps.net US 73.00 343
dns.aa.net.uk UK 71.40 344
doh.xfinity.com US 23.53 347
dns.containerpi.com JP 162.10 347
doh.opendns.com anycast 3.90 355
jcdns.fun NL 85.23 358
rdns.faelix.net anycast 82.70 358
dns.hostux.net LU 81.60 364
dohdot.coxlab.net US N/A 376
doh-2.seby.io AU N/A 377
dns.twnic.tw TW 230.00 380
doh.dns.sb anycast 3.20 388
ibksturm.synology.me CH 105.80 416
jp.tiarap.org anycast 3.28 421
ibuki.cgnat.net BR 137.10 426
dns.dns-over-https.com JP N/A 452
recursor have caused large-scale disruptions in web browsing
activities [51]. To protect user data from compromised resolvers,
Nakatsuka et al. [36] developed an architecture based on trusted
execution environments and remote attestation to allow users
to verify the resolution software running on the recursor.
Schmitt et al. [41] propose a resolution mechanism to
anonymize users’ DNS queries by decoupling the link between
users and their DNS queries. More specifically, the mechanism
introduces an entity, called an Oblivious DNS (ODNS) resolver,
residing between the user and the traditional recursor. This
ODNS resolver hides the identity of the user from the traditional
resolver, while not knowing any information about the domain
names being queried.
While it might be expected that DoT/DoH resolutions will
take longer than traditional DNS due to the need to establish a
secure connection, Hounsel et. al [17] conducted a measurement
study and found that this is not always the case. Similarly to our
findings in VI-C, the authors find that the resolution time can
vary from resolver to resolver depending on the implementations
of both the DNS client and the resolver. In addition to specific
resolvers, the authors find that encrypted DNS can perform just
as well or even better than traditional DNS in certain network
conditions. Overhead costs of establishing a TCP connection
could be amortized on large loads, and TCP allows for faster
retransmissions on lossy networks [17].
VIII. DISCUSSION
In our current prototype, we use bucket hashing to disperse
DNS resolutions across DoH servers. However, we have shown
in §VI that there are still some corner cases that would
benefit from future work that will investigate more case-specific
domain resolution distribution algorithms. More specifically,
we observed cases in which several “sensitive” domains are
resolved by the same DoH recursor, which is not optimal as
long as there are other resolvers in the pool that have not
received any sensitive resolution at all. However, as mentioned
earlier, the sensitivity of a domain depends on who, when, and
from where visited a given website. Therefore, another domain
name distribution approach that future work can investigate is to
take the website category into consideration, such that domains
in the same category are resolved by the same recursors.
As discussed in §IV, all subsequent DNS queries generated
by rendering a web page are also resolved by the same DoH
recursor that resolves the website’s parent domain. However,
DNS prefetching could have a negative impact on the privacy
benefit provided by our K-resolver mechanism. For example,
consider a user who relies on a search engine to look up
websites of interest. If DNS prefetching is enabled, the recursor
that resolves the search engine domain name (e.g., bing.com,
google.com) would also observe all domain names of interest
that the user could potentially visit later. To that end, we suggest
that DNS prefetching should be disabled when using K-resolver,
as also is recommended by prior studies [25, 26].
While we opt to implement our K-resolver mechanism in
a web browser since this is the root cause of recent debates
surrounding centralized DoH/DoT, DNS resolution is generally
handled by the operating system (OS). Although there have been
some efforts to support DoH/DoT resolution at the OS level [23,
48], all queries are still sent to a single “trusted” resolver. We
hope that our proposed mechanism will also prompt OS vendors
to take a major role in adjusting the OS resolver so that multiple
DoH/DoT recursors can be configured at the OS level.
IX. CONCLUSION
For more than 35 years, DNS has been one of the core
protocols of the Internet. Its original unencrypted design does
not take security and privacy into consideration, allowing any
on-path entity between a user and the DNS recursor to learn
the user’s browsing history. The DoH/DoT protocols aim to
solve this very problem by transmitting DNS queries over an
encrypted HTTPS/TLS channel. However, the recent design
decision of major web browsers to centralize all DNS queries
into one DoH/DoT recursor has sparked controversy among
Internet activists and online privacy advocates.
In this work, we introduced K-resolver, a resolution mech-
anism in which DNS queries are dispersed across multiple
recursors, exposing this way only a fraction of a user’s browsing
history to each recursor. Although the impact of this resolution
mechanism on web page load time is obvious, we have shown
that this is primarily due to the lack of well-provisioned anycast
recursors. We hope that our work will inspire further privacy-
enhancing improvements to the default DoH configuration of
major browsers, as well as operating systems. We believe that,
in an idealistic future where the number of independent, well-
provisioned anycast recursors will be larger, distributing DNS
queries across multiple recursors is a promising approach for
improving the online privacy of Internet users.
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